Drug trade consolidating Burmese Army control over Shan State

By offering drugs as financial means to local militias, the Burma Army has been successfully extending its grip inside areas hitherto denied by rebel presence, says a recent case study by Ph.D candidate.

The study, a culmination of field trips to Burma over the past three years, reports that the drug trade has become embedded in Burma Army’s dual strategy of extending its territorial reach and using local militias more or less subservient to the Army, with little or no burden to the government expenditures.

• The Army was instructed in 1997 by the War Office to live off the land saying that troops “were to meet their basic logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the central supply system”. This was reflected by the significant decrease in dry rations provided to soldiers by the central government.

The result was the increased reliance of Burmese troops on extracting revenue from the population. “A farmer must plough his land 5 times, once for the military, once for the rebels, once for the police, once for his religious duties, and, once, finally for himself and his family,” is a saying commonplace in Pinlong (Panglawng) township.

The revenue derived also includes “ad hoc taxation of poppy farmers and traders by local military units (often coupled with the threat of crop destruction for failure to comply), and the emergence of local protection rackets through which military commanders were able to demand money in return for ensuring an environment of impunity and, in some cases, more direct support in the form of protection.”

• The most significant has been the emergence of a large number of local People’s Militia Forces (PMFs), supported by the Army, many of which are deeply implicated in the drug trade.”

Through them, the Army has been able “to extend and deepen the means of coercive power beyond the major towns. By offering them a degree of local autonomy and financial opportunity, the Army has been far more successfully at co-opting these groups than it would have been if it has demanded that they mobilize or be incorporated into the regular Army.”

The author has cited Panhsay Kyaw Myint, PMF leader in Namkham township, who was elected as an MP to the Shan State Parliament as a representative of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), “in an election campaign that promised that poppy cultivation in the area would continue to be protected for a further five years.”

The researcher does not place much trust in the ongoing peace process initiated by President Thein Sein. “Any kind of enduring peace settlement in Shan State will require the government granting at least some political and economic concessions, which many within the military will have serious misgivings about.” Their view is that by further pursuance of their dual strategy, “it may be possible to weaken non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to such an extent that they have no bargaining power left, allowing the government to avoid granting extensive concessions.”

Burma has concluded ceasefire agreements with 14 armed groups. Naypyitaw says only two major armed groups are yet to be on board: Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).

Bangkok Post, 25 November 2013, meanwhile, blasted the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for issuing almost identical messages for 2012 and 2013:

2012:    Record-high methamphetamine seizures in Southeast Asia in 2012
2013:    Record-high methamphetamine seizures in Southeast Asia